Rethinking U.S. Investment Adviser Regulation by Krug, Anita K.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 87 
Number 2 Volume 87, Spring-Summer 2013, 
Numbers 2-3 
Article 7 
April 2014 
Rethinking U.S. Investment Adviser Regulation 
Anita K. Krug 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Krug, Anita K. (2013) "Rethinking U.S. Investment Adviser Regulation ," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 87 : No. 
2 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol87/iss2/7 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
FINAL_KRUG 2/27/2014 6:24 PM 
 
451 
RETHINKING U.S. INVESTMENT  
ADVISER REGULATION 
ANITA K. KRUG† 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the U.S. Investment Advisers Act of 19401 (the 
“Advisers Act”) was not at the center of the post-financial crisis 
regulatory reform that culminated in the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act2 (“Dodd-Frank” or 
“Dodd-Frank Act”), it was certainly part of the reform effort.  In 
particular, Dodd-Frank amended the Advisers Act—the federal 
statute that regulates investment advisers and their activities—
in a manner intended to address the ways in which privately-
offered funds, particularly hedge funds, may have exacerbated 
the financial crisis.  The primary regulatory concern, whether 
valid or not, was that, given the magnitude of assets invested in 
hedge funds and hedge funds’ penchant for pursuing certain 
types of risky investment activities, such as taking positions in 
credit default swaps, those funds potentially helped create 
systemic risk.3  Arguably, Dodd-Frank was about nothing if not 
mitigating systemic risk. 
And so lawmakers set about to bolster “hedge fund 
regulation.”  They did so, ultimately, by effectively stapling 
various hedge fund-related provisions to the Advisers Act, 
notwithstanding that that statute theretofore contained nary a 
mention of hedge funds.  In broad strokes, as a result of Dodd-
Frank’s amendments and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s (the “SEC”) rulemaking under Dodd-Frank, 
investment advisers who manage hedge funds are required to 
 
† Assistant Professor, University of Washington School of Law. 
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2012). 
2 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the 
U.S. Code). 
3 See Edmund L. Andrews & Louise Story, Geithner To Outline Major Overhaul 
of Finance Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/ 
business/economy/26regulate.html?dbk. 
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become registered with, and regulated by, either the SEC or the 
relevant state regulatory authorities.4  That result is, in large 
part, a product of Dodd-Frank’s elimination of an exemption from 
SEC registration on which, prior to Dodd-Frank, many advisers 
to hedge funds had relied.5  In addition, most advisers managing 
enough assets to be required to register with the SEC are now 
required to submit to the SEC periodic reports containing a wide 
range of information about the funds they manage, including 
those funds’ investment activities and portfolio holdings.6  The 
SEC, furthermore, is authorized to share that information with 
the newly-created Financial Services Oversight Council.7 
Now, in the aftermath of Dodd-Frank’s enactment and the 
SEC’s associated bout of rulemaking, one might think that the 
Advisers Act’s regulatory regime is a workable and effective one, 
equipped to address—and address efficiently—the investor-
protection risks that the twenty-first-century investment adviser 
industry produces.  In fact, however, Dodd-Frank did not touch—
and, indeed, Dodd-Frank’s crafters indicated no awareness of—
many of the Advisers Act’s longstanding troubles.  Additionally, 
the changes Dodd-Frank brought about have their own 
considerable deficiencies.  As this Article contends, the U.S. 
investment adviser regulatory regime, now seventy-four years 
old, is in need of more than a few statutory amendments and new 
SEC rules.  For the sake of the investor-protection goals of 
securities regulation, the promotion of market integrity, and 
regulatory efficiency, U.S. investment adviser regulation needs to 
be rethought and reformed.  Focusing both on longstanding and 
new regulatory weaknesses, this Article highlights five grounds 
for that conclusion. 
 
 
4 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-2(a)(29), -3(b), -3a(a); 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.203A-1, -5 (2013). 
5 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3). 
6 See id. § 80b-4; 17 C.F.R. § 275.204(b)-1(a). 
7 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(b). In addition, those larger advisers, by AUM, who 
manage only hedge funds and therefore may rely on an exemption from SEC 
registration—until those funds’ collective assets reach $150 million—must 
nonetheless report certain types of information with the SEC and comply with 
certain other requirements under the Advisers Act. See id. § 80b-3(m); 
17 C.F.R. § 275.204-4. 
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I. REGULATION EXEMPTIONS 
The shortcomings of the U.S. investment adviser regulatory 
regime begin with the rules dictating who must become 
registered as an investment adviser and who may avail 
themselves of an exemption from registration—and, therefore, 
regulation by the SEC.  Prior to the regulatory changes that the 
Dodd-Frank Act effected, things were rather simple in that 
regard.  In particular, an investment adviser that had in excess 
of twenty-five million dollars under management and at least 
fifteen “clients” had to become registered.8  Those advisers that 
managed the threshold amount of assets but that had fewer than 
fifteen clients were generally exempt from SEC registration.9  
Advisers who had assets under management (“AUM”) below 
twenty-five million dollars were generally prohibited from 
becoming registered with the SEC, based on Congress’s judgment 
that such smaller advisers reasonably fell within state, rather 
than federal, regulatory jurisdiction.10 
The rationale for the client-based exemption was that an 
adviser that provides its investment advice only to a very small 
number of clients creates no particular threat to the regulatory 
goal of ensuring the integrity of the securities markets and 
arguably creates only a de minimis concern for the goal of 
protecting investors.  As many readers might recall—and as Part 
II elaborates further—the fewer-than-fifteen-client exemption 
came to create fairly substantial regulatory concerns once hedge 
funds and other private funds came to dominate investment 
advisory services.11  That complication aside, and as discussed 
below, an exemption based on client count generally seemed to be 
a reasonable one.  However, the long and rocky reform process 
that led to the Dodd-Frank Act would not countenance the client-
 
8 See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1(a)(2)(i) (removed 2011). Even if an adviser met 
those requirements, it was nonetheless required to become SEC-registered if it 
satisfied certain other conditions, such as if it managed a mutual fund or other 
registered investment company. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a)(1)(B). 
9 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a)(1)(B). 
10 See id. § 80b-3a(a). Any such smaller adviser may or may not have had to 
register with the relevant states, depending on the particular states’ regulatory 
regimes. 
11 That concern is evidenced by the so-called “hedge fund registration rule” that 
the SEC adopted in 2004, see Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge 
Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,05758, 72,070 (Dec. 10, 2004) (codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 275, 279), which the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals 
vacated in 2006, see Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 88081 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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based exemption’s survival.12  Eliminating the exemption, of 
course, was only one of the myriad changes that Dodd-Frank and 
the associated SEC rules made to the Advisers Act’s regulatory 
scope.13 
The Dodd-Frank amendments, at their core, were designed 
to more effectively regulate investment advisers to private 
funds—hedge funds, in particular—and the particular risks to 
systemic stability that hedge funds were seen to be creating.  
Toward that end, the amendments expressly acknowledge that 
some advisers may manage hedge funds, while others do not, and 
tailor the Advisers Act’s newly reformulated registration 
exemption accordingly.  Post-Dodd-Frank, an adviser managing 
between $25 million and $100 million in assets may not register 
with the SEC unless the adviser would not otherwise be subject 
to regulation by a state authority.14  Investment advisers with 
less than $25 million in AUM generally may not register with the 
SEC, regardless of what the relevant state requirements might 
be. 
One hundred million dollars, then, is the new asset-based 
threshold for SEC registration.  However, pursuant to a rule that 
the SEC adopted under Dodd-Frank, an adviser that manages 
only private funds need not become registered with the SEC if its 
AUM is below $150 million—again, as long as the adviser is 
otherwise subject to regulation by the relevant state or states.15  
So, for example, an adviser that manages one hedge fund with 
three investors and, separately, the assets held by three 
individuals in three separate brokerage accounts is subject to the 
$100 million threshold.  However, if those individuals instead 
placed their account assets in the hedge fund, the $150 million 
threshold would apply.  The amendments and new rules contain  
 
 
 
12 See, e.g., Gillian Tett, Dodd Frank’s Long-Distance Paper Chase, FIN. TIMES 
(Oct. 28, 2011, 5:27 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1d6d6808-009a-11e1-ba33-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2QSwtPBey (discussing the “sheer complexity and opacity 
of the reform process”). 
13 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, §§ 401–419, 124 Stat. 1376, 1570–80 (2010). 
14 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-2(a)(29), -3(b), -3a(a); 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.203A-1, -5 (2013). 
15 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(m)(1); 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.203(m)-1. However, as noted, 
these advisers are still required to report information to the SEC regarding the 
funds they manage. See supra note 7. 
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substantially greater complexity than this brief description 
suggests, but these are the important components for present 
purposes. 
If the objectives of investment adviser regulation remain 
primarily to protect investors and promote market integrity, 
while encouraging innovation and a robust securities market, 
then the new exemption regime seems ill-suited to further 
regulatory objectives.  Arguably, there continues to be a de 
minimis level of investment advisory activity, regardless of the 
amount of assets involved, that does not call for regulatory 
oversight in the form of investment adviser registration and 
regulation.  However, as the description above suggests, the 
Dodd-Frank amendments fail to make such a distinction—nor do 
they even try—save to specify that advisers managing only 
private funds may remain unregistered until they reach the $150 
million AUM threshold.  Rather, all investment advisers with 
greater than $100 million—or $150 million, as the case may be—
under management must become registered and be substantively 
regulated, even if they have only a very small number of clients.  
That approach may constitute excessive regulation, causing 
inefficient and poor use of regulatory resources, and, moreover, is 
inconsistent with the approach the SEC has pursued under the 
Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”)16 and its exemption 
from registration for securities offerings that are “non-public.”17  
Under one of the safe harbors set forth in Regulation D under the 
Securities Act, for example, a securities offering remains exempt 
from SEC registration if all but thirty-five of the offerees meet 
certain financial qualification thresholds, provided the issuer 
complies with a few other requirements.18 
A better approach for amending the Advisers Act would have 
been to continue with a client-based exemption, perhaps one that 
aligns with the securities laws’ private placement exemption.  
That is, if, prior to the financial crisis, an exemption from 
registration based on the number of clients an adviser advises 
was reasonable, there is no apparent basis—whether arising 
from the financial crisis or otherwise—for concluding that such 
an exemption has become unreasonable.  Indeed, there are good 
arguments not only for continuing that exemption but for 
 
16 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa. 
17 See id. § 77d(a)(2). 
18 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–.508. 
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expanding it such that an adviser with considerably more than 
fourteen clients may remain exempt from registration so long as 
those clients meet specified wealth or sophistication tests. 
To be sure, as noted, Dodd-Frank allows a limited exemption 
for those advisers that manage only private funds.19  That 
exemption, however, is wrong-headed because it disregards the 
nature of private funds.  Private funds may be thought of as an 
aggregation of clients—a pooling of those who might otherwise 
have engaged an adviser directly but instead invested in a fund 
that the adviser manages.  A simple example illustrates the 
concern:  Our adviser noted above who manages a small private 
fund with very few investors and, separately, three individuals’ 
brokerage accounts cannot avail itself of the limited exemption, 
whereas an adviser managing only private funds but with 
thousands of investors—would-be clients—in those funds could 
avail itself of the exemption.  Viewed in that light, for purposes of 
exemptions under the Advisers Act based on the number of 
clients an adviser has, separate account clients and private fund 
investors should have the same status.  Each of them, in other 
words, should count.  In ignoring both this circumstance and the 
pointlessness of requiring those advisers with only a small 
number of clients and/or fund investors to become registered, 
Congress and the SEC squandered an opportunity to make the 
Advisers Act more coherent and regulation more efficient. 
II. HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS 
A second weakness of the current U.S. investment adviser 
regulatory regime is—perhaps surprisingly—its failure to 
adequately address the growth and continued prevalence of 
private funds.20  These are pooled investment vehicles, such as 
hedge funds, venture capital funds, and private equity funds, to 
name a few, that are exempt from registration with the SEC 
under the U.S. Investment Company Act of 194021 (the “ICA”).  
That exemption distinguishes these funds from mutual funds and 
 
19 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
20 To be sure, notwithstanding the growth of private funds, many investment 
advisers do not manage any, focusing instead on, for example, managing “separate 
accounts” on behalf of individual or institutional clients or advising clients on a non-
discretionary basis. 
21 The exemption is a product of the ICA’s exclusion of those funds from the 
statute’s definition of “investment company.” See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c). 
FINAL_KRUG 2/27/2014  6:24 PM 
2013] U.S. INVESTMENT ADVISER REGULATION 457 
other publicly-held funds, which are so registered and, therefore, 
must comply with the ICA’s substantive provisions.22  The 
problems with investment adviser regulation, insofar as private 
funds are concerned, are a product of the fact that the Advisers 
Act did not expressly contemplate private funds at the time of its 
enactment, and regulators’ later attempts to address them have 
created piecemeal, patchwork legislation and rules that render 
the Advisers Act, taken as a whole, less than effective in 
addressing the regulatory concerns that private funds create.23 
This author has articulated several of these problems 
elsewhere.24  For example, once private funds came onto the 
scene, over time lawmakers and regulators formulated a doctrine 
under which the private funds that an adviser manages—rather 
than the private funds’ myriad investors—are deemed to be the 
adviser’s “clients” and, therefore, the subject of the Advisers Act’s 
protections.25  That doctrine makes little sense when one 
considers that private funds’ origins lie in their role as a 
mechanism of convenience, to facilitate an adviser’s management 
of the assets of smaller would-be clients.26  It also, and more 
problematically, creates anomalies that militate against the 
Advisers Act’s investor protection objectives.27 
Specifically, the doctrine’s implications for those objectives is 
a product of the sorts of protections the Advisers Act provides.  
Consistent with the U.S. securities laws generally, the Advisers 
Act seeks to protect advisory clients through, among other 
things, requiring that advisers make certain types of disclosures 
to their clients.28  Moreover, given that an adviser is a fiduciary 
to its clients, the Advisers Act’s anti-fraud provisions are to be 
given a broad, remedial construction, rather than a narrow, 
 
22 See id. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (identifying the numerous provisions of the ICA). 
23 See Anita K. Krug, Institutionalization, Investment Adviser Regulation, and 
the Hedge Fund Problem, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 1517 (2011) [hereinafter Krug, The 
Hedge Fund Problem]. 
24 See id. at 28–31; Anita K. Krug, Moving Beyond the Clamor for “Hedge Fund 
Regulation”: A Reconsideration of “Client” Under the Investment Advisers Act of 
1940, 55 VILL. L. REV. 661, 672–79 (2010) [hereinafter Krug, Moving Beyond the 
Clamor]. 
25 See Krug, The Hedge Fund Problem, supra note 23, at 28–31. 
26 See Krug, Moving Beyond the Clamor, supra note 24, at 690–91. 
27 See id. at 672–79. 
28 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-3(b) (2013); Krug, The 
Hedge Fund Problem, supra note 23, at 27 n.120. 
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technical one.29  That, in turn, means that, for an adviser to be in 
compliance with those provisions—in other words, for it to avoid 
being deemed to have deceived or misled clients—the adviser’s 
disclosures to its clients regarding its activities and services must 
be similarly broad and encompassing.30  A second regulatory tool 
of the Advisers Act is to require advisers to obtain client consent 
before engaging in certain types of activities, such as those as to 
which the adviser’s interests may be seen as adverse to its 
clients’ interests.31 
When the private fund that an adviser manages, rather than 
the fund’s investors, is the “client,” then it is the fund—and not 
its investors—that is formally entitled to receive the adviser’s 
disclosures and to provide or not provide consent to the adviser’s 
proposed conflict-of-interest transactions.  That might not be 
problematic if the fund’s representatives or spokespersons were 
trustees of or fiduciaries as to the investors’ interests.  In fact, 
however, it is very often the case that the adviser itself controls 
and speaks for—and consents on behalf of—the fund, whether as 
a formal matter or as a de facto one.32  The fund, after all, is 
typically the adviser’s creation—again, a mechanism of efficiency 
in the adviser’s management of numerous investors’ assets.  This 
doctrine remains intact in our post-Dodd-Frank world.33 
That the SEC and Congress, combined with the courts, 
adopted the doctrine evinces a regulatory focus on the “thing” 
whose assets the adviser actually deploys for investment in 
securities and other instruments.  In this case, as in many, the 
thing is an entity, one whose boundaries regulation does not look 
beyond to discern the substance of the relationship between a 
private fund’s investors and the fund’s adviser.  It is a 
manifestation of entity-centrism in securities regulation—or, in 
other words, the tendency of laws and regulations to give undue 
weight to discrete entities based on an apparent assumption that 
each entity is an isolated whole, independent of relationships 
that further define it and that are constitutive of it. 
 
 
29 See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963). 
30 See id. at 196–97. 
31 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-5(a), -6(3) (2012). 
32 See Krug, Moving Beyond the Clamor, supra note 24, at 673. 
33 See id. 
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Indeed, we might see that tendency in a second substantive 
problem with the Advisers Act’s approach to regulation of 
advisers to private funds.  That problem centers on the fact that 
many advisory firms are not themselves stand-alone entities but, 
instead, are part of a group—be it large or small—of affiliated 
entities.  That may be because a financial enterprise provides 
various types of financial services—for example, investment 
advice, broker-dealer services, and insurance.  In those cases, it 
is at least reasonable for each type of service provided to be 
housed in a separate entity, if only for liability limitation and 
risk management purposes.  However, in the investment 
advisory arena, it is also not at all unusual for advisers who 
manage private funds to create multiple entities devoted to the 
advisers’ private-fund advisory activities.  In those situations, the 
investment advisory firm itself comprises multiple entities. 
Most commonly in such circumstances, the entity that 
formally serves as the investment adviser to the private funds—
and that is subject to regulation as such—has a merely 
contractual relationship with the fund, while a second entity, 
typically with the same ownership as the investment adviser 
entity, is formed to be the funds’ general partner or managing 
member.34  The entities’ owners may opt for this sort of “split 
structure” for any of a number of reasons, but a common one is to 
achieve more favorable tax treatment where, for example, the 
funds’ compensation to the adviser takes the form of a profit 
allocation or the adviser plans to engage marketers to recruit 
fund investors.35  Although this structure is more complex than 
one in which the investment adviser entity also serves as the 
general partner, the tax savings to the firm or achievement of 
other objectives is considered worth the complexity—at least 
until one considers the regulatory complications the structure 
has tended to create. 
The investment adviser regulatory regime does not, in many 
respects, contemplate that an investment advisory firm may 
comprise multiple entities.  As a result, although the investment 
adviser entity is the registered and regulated entity, there 
 
34 See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Bus. Law, SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 
3334980, at *9, *28 (Dec. 8, 2005) (discussing requirements for investment advisers 
to hedge funds in establishing another entity to serve as a hedge fund’s general 
partner). 
35 See id. 
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necessarily remains the lingering question—one that has caused 
considerable regulatory handwringing—of whether the general 
partner entities must also become registered or whether, to the 
contrary, they need not do so.  The rationale for requiring 
registration is that a general partner entity does things that the 
investment adviser entity would otherwise do, namely receive 
compensation from the fund that, but for the split structure, the 
adviser entity would receive.  Accordingly, so the argument goes, 
the general partner entity is subject to the same conflicts of 
interest as the adviser entity in connection with its operation of 
the fund—in its capacity as the fund’s general partner—
notwithstanding that the general partner is not the entity that 
formally manages the fund’s investments.  The rationale for the 
general partner entity’s not having to become registered is, of 
course, exactly that:  The entity does not provide investment 
advice, so why should it have to be regulated as an investment 
adviser, especially since that regulation would be duplicative of 
the regulation of the investment adviser entity?36 
Over time, the SEC developed a solution, which, in a nut 
shell, was to allow the special purpose entity to forego 
registration as an investment adviser, so long as it both 
maintained the sorts of books and records that it would be 
required to maintain if it were registered as an adviser and made 
those books and records available for examination by the SEC 
staff to the same extent as the registered entity.37  State 
regulators, which are responsible for regulating ever-more 
investment advisers as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
amendments to the Advisers Act,38 have remained considerably 
more flummoxed, in some cases evincing little understanding of 
the rationale for split structures and extreme skepticism about 
the SEC’s compromise approach.  The result has doubtless been 
to cause split-structure investment advisory firms to bear 
substantially greater regulation-related expenses and to confront 
substantially greater regulatory obstacles than what need be the 
case.  That, in turn, highlights once again how investment 
adviser regulation is unduly focused on entities and entity-
separation, at the expense of addressing firms’ substantive  
 
 
36 See id. 
37 See id. 
38 See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
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activities and the risks those activities create.  Accordingly, it 
also highlights another way in which investment adviser 
regulation could be improved. 
III. ADVISERS TO PUBLICLY-OFFERED FUNDS 
As the previous Part discusses, U.S. investment adviser 
regulation remains poorly suited for the regulation of investment 
advisers managing private funds.  That is, in part, a product of 
the fact that private-fund-specific regulation is essentially tacked 
on to the original regulatory structure.  Unlike private funds, 
publicly-held funds, such as mutual funds, were well within 
Congress’s view at the time it enacted the securities statutes and, 
also unlike private funds, are subject to their own separate and 
complex regulatory regime, namely that established by the ICA.39  
Nonetheless, investment adviser regulation is likewise 
problematic in its coverage of investment advisers to public 
funds. 
The ICA was enacted at the same time as the Advisers Act, 
its companion statute.  Whereas the Advisers Act regulates 
investment advisers, and, therefore, “private fund regulation” is 
achieved through regulation of investment advisers to private 
funds, the ICA regulates public funds themselves.40  And 
extensive regulation it is.  Among other things, the ICA specifies 
that each public fund—an “investment company” under the 
ICA—is to be managed and governed by a mostly-“independent” 
board of directors,41 which oversees the investment company’s 
activities, including the investment company’s relationships with 
its investment adviser and its other service providers, such as its 
administrator, its transfer agent, and its distributors.42   
The board, moreover, oversees the investment company’s 
compliance with the many substantive requirements set forth in 
the ICA.43  Among those requirements are ones governing 
leverage and investment portfolio composition, which are 
intended to limit the riskiness of the investment company’s 
investment strategy;44 transactions between the investment 
 
39 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2012). 
40 See id. 
41 See id. § 80a-10(b). 
42 See id. §§ 80a-1 to -64. 
43 See id. 
44 See id. § 80a-12. 
FINAL_KRUG 2/27/2014  6:24 PM 
462 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:451   
company and certain of its affiliated persons;45 and the 
procedures that must be followed before the investment company 
may bear distribution expenses.46  Moreover, the investment 
company must hold occasional shareholder (investor) meetings 
for purposes of electing or removing members of the board and 
approving the investment advisory agreement between the 
investment company and its investment adviser, as well as 
weighing in on any other matters that the board may determine 
to put before the shareholders.47 
The rationale for such extensive regulation is not difficult to 
discern.  ICA-registered investment companies are public 
companies,48 meaning that anyone, including so-called retail—or 
“unsophisticated”—investors, is eligible to invest in them.  The 
policy judgment behind regulation is that such investors are in 
greater need of regulatory protection, as compared with private 
fund investors, who, under Rule 506 of Regulation D, must meet 
certain financial sophistication thresholds.49  Certainly that 
rationale would seem to present little with which to quibble and, 
indeed, is consonant with the approach to an exemption from 
investment adviser regulation proposed in Part I.  Whether the 
regulation itself is coherent and effective is a separate question. 
Although there are reasons to answer that question in the 
negative, the analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, focused 
as it is on the regulation of investment advisers.  That very 
dichotomy, however, reveals the difficulty with investment 
adviser regulation, insofar as it encompasses investment advisers 
to investment companies.  To put it succinctly—and, perhaps, a 
bit too colloquially—the ICA and the Advisers Act step all over 
one another and, together, arguably constitute inefficient and 
redundant regulation.  To see how this is so, we need to think 
about what, exactly, an investment company is and, more 
specifically, how it operates. 
Many business enterprises are managed by persons that do 
not actually own an appreciable part of the firm’s equity.  That 
state of affairs leads to the classic problem of corporate 
governance—namely, how to keep managers accountable to 
 
45 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.17a-6 to -7 (2013). 
46 See id. § 270.12b-1. 
47 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15. 
48 See id. § 80a-1(a)(1). 
49 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. 
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shareholders or other relevant stakeholders and reduce agency 
costs.50  Although investment companies formally have corporate 
structures, they lack the core relationships—among officers, 
directors, and shareholders—present within “operating” 
companies—General Electric, Facebook, Costco, or Starbucks, for 
example.  Rather than governance by a management group 
internal to the entity, an investment company is effectively 
governed by a separate firm altogether.51  In particular, the 
investment company’s operations and investment activities often 
are largely under the control of its investment adviser, and, 
similar to a private fund, the investment company typically 
exists solely by virtue of the investment adviser’s decision to 
create it.52 
Among other things, the investment adviser typically 
employs the portfolio managers that manage the investment 
company’s portfolio, selects and negotiates arrangements with 
the company’s service providers, and is primarily in charge of the 
investment company’s compliance with many of its regulatory 
obligations.53  To be sure, investment companies are required to 
have boards of directors who, as noted, are formally responsible 
for the investment company’s governance and regulatory 
compliance.54  In practice, however, investment company boards 
have tended to defer to the wishes of the investment adviser, 
particularly to the extent that board members lack expertise 
regarding investment company operations and regulation.55  In 
essence, investment companies may be considered less as 
companies and more as true investment “vehicles,” doing really 
nothing other than facilitating the investment adviser’s 
aggregated management of the assets of numerous discrete 
investors. 
 
50 See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); see Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs 
Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 634, 636 (2004). 
51 See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 338 (2010); Lyman Johnson, A 
Fresh Look at Director “Independence”: Mutual Fund Fee Litigation and Gartenberg 
at Twenty-Five, 61 VAND. L. REV. 497, 503 (2008). 
52 See Jones, 559 U.S. at 338; Johnson, supra note 51, at 503–04. 
53 See Jones, 559 U.S. at 338; Johnson, supra note 51, at 503–04. 
54 See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text. 
55 See A. Joseph Warburton, Should Mutual Funds Be Corporations? A Legal 
and Econometric Analysis, 33 J. CORP. L. 745, 752–53 (2008). 
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Neither the ICA nor the Advisers Act reflects that 
circumstance, however.  That is evidenced by the statutes’ 
imposition of dual, yet similar, regulatory obligations on both an 
investment company and its investment adviser.  For example, 
the ICA contains a requirement that the investment company 
and the investment adviser adopt and maintain a “code of ethics” 
that is reasonably designed to ensure their respective compliance 
with applicable laws and to mitigate conflicts of interest that 
might exist between shareholders, on one hand, and the 
investment company or its investment adviser or any of their 
respective “access persons,” on the other.56  For these purposes, 
the investment adviser’s directors and officers may be deemed to 
be access persons of the investment company.57  Accordingly, at 
least some of the investment adviser’s personnel may be subject 
to restrictions set forth in the investment company’s code of 
ethics, including those governing trading and investing in the 
same securities or types of securities as those in which the 
investment company invests. 
Certainly the regulatory objectives behind the code-of-ethics 
requirement are sound.  As the ICA itself suggests, conflicts of 
interest in connection with proprietary trades were among the 
primary problems afflicting the investment company industry at 
the time the ICA was enacted.58  Incoherence derives from the 
fact that, under Advisers Act—as a result of relatively recent 
changes to the rules under that Act—the investment adviser is 
also directly subject to a code-of-ethics requirement.59  Yet 
neither Congress nor the SEC has clearly specified how these 
separate code-of-ethics requirements relate to one another, why 
investment advisers to investment companies must comply with 
duplicative regulatory provisions, or what is the rationale behind 
requiring certain investment advisory personnel to comply with 
two separate codes of ethics.  A similar question arises as to the 
ICA’s requirement that an investment company have a “chief 
compliance officer,”60 given that the rules under the Advisers Act 
require the same of investment advisers.61  Moreover, investment 
 
56 See 17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-1(c) (2013). 
57 See id. § 270.17j-1(a)(1)(i). 
58 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (2012). 
59 See 17 C.F.R. § 275.204A-1. 
60 See id. § 270.38a-1(a)(4). 
61 See id. § 275.206(4)-7(c). 
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companies are required to adopt policies and procedures 
reasonably designed to prevent, detect, and address possible 
risks associated with most aspects of their operations,62 a 
requirement that is similar to one applicable to investment 
advisers under the Advisers Act.63 
This duplication, of course, presumably does not redound to 
the detriment of investors, nor does it likely have any discernible 
impact on the market for investment advisers or, for that matter, 
on the investment company industry.  However, the duplication 
highlights the uneasy fit between the ICA and the Advisers Act, 
statutes that may be “companions” and that may regulate 
intertwined fields of activity but that, in many ways, seem 
distinct and independent from one another.  Part of the problem 
is that investment company regulation may not adequately 
reflect that an investment adviser is an essential part of what an 
investment company does.  Perhaps, to address the matter, 
investment adviser regulation should encompass investment 
company regulation or vice versa.  What is clear is that the 
apparent lack of coordination between the two statutes at least 
raises the prospect that consolidating the regulatory regimes 
could lead to greater regulatory efficiency, not to mention greater 
regulatory coherence. 
IV. SPECIFIC RULES VERSUS BROAD STANDARDS 
At the risk of painting with too large a brush, one might say 
that the U.S. securities laws are generally standards-based, 
rather than rules-based.  They are premised, in the name of 
efficiency, on the goal of informing securities markets 
participants and, toward that end, require that those who aim to 
sell securities to, or buy securities from, less-informed 
counterparties disclose all material information so that, in the 
transaction, those counterparties will not be unfairly 
disadvantaged.64  In other words, eschewing specific rules and 
procedures for securities markets transactions, the U.S.  
 
 
 
62 See id. § 270.38a-1. 
63 See id. § 275.206(4)-7. 
64 See Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A 
Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 330 (1988). 
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securities regulatory regime pursues its objectives primarily 
through broad disclosure standards, leaving it to the regulatory 
subjects to determine how best to meet those standards.   
The ICA’s approach to investment company regulation 
arguably constitutes an exception to that basic regulatory 
approach.  As suggested in the previous section, the ICA contains 
specific requirements,65 which cover matters ranging from the 
composition of an investment company’s board of directors66 to 
the amount of leverage the investment company may use in its 
investment activities.67  The list could continue, but the point 
should be apparent:  The ICA, in many respects, does not rely 
only on generally-phrased disclosure requirements, and, to the 
extent it mandates disclosure, it does not, for the most part, leave 
it entirely up to investment companies and their boards to 
determine what that disclosure should be.68  Accordingly, the ICA 
might be said to embrace a rules-based approach, at least in 
comparison to U.S. securities laws and regulations generally.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, so might the Advisers Act, albeit 
to a lesser extent. 
Whether the securities laws’ standards-based disclosure 
regime is able to achieve its objectives is, at best, open for debate.  
Certainly there are reasons to be skeptical.  Nonetheless, 
whatever may be the costs or benefits of deploying standards in 
most securities regulatory contexts, the rules that pervade 
investment adviser regulation are, for the most part, 
counterproductive.  One difficulty with the sorts of substantive 
requirements that are reflected in the Advisers Act and the 
SEC’s rules under that statute is that those requirements and 
rules are so readily overtaken by changes in the subject matter to 
which they apply.  Put another way, the rules’ specific, granular 
requirements are susceptible to becoming incoherent in their 
application and/or obsolete and, therefore, irrelevant—if not 
actually harmful—on a net basis.  A second difficulty is, perhaps, 
more singular:  Many of the Advisers Act’s substantive rules 
seem not to serve any worthy regulatory purpose.  Two examples 
are illustrative. 
 
65 See supra notes 41–47 and accompanying text. 
66 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
67 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
68 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-8, -30 (2012).  
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Beginning with the Advisers Act itself, as opposed to the 
SEC’s rules, section 205 of that statute requires that certain 
types of provisions be included in investment advisory 
agreements entered into by SEC-regulated investment advisers.69  
To begin with, if the adviser is organized as a partnership, the 
agreement must contain a provision obligating the adviser to 
inform the client of any change in the adviser’s “membership.”70  
The SEC, in a “no-action letter,” has taken the position that, if 
the partnership in question is a limited partnership, then the 
advisory agreement need only contain a provision to the effect 
that the adviser will notify the client of a change in the adviser’s 
general partner.71  Apart from presenting the curiosity of 
requiring certain client notifications through regulating the 
contents of advisory agreements rather than through directly 
imposing the obligation, there are a number of difficulties with 
this provision.   
First, one can imagine that a change of a partnership’s 
membership, particularly one involving the general partner of a 
limited partnership, would be tantamount to an assignment of 
the agreement, in which case the adviser’s fiduciary duties 
should serve to protect the client.  Second, there are myriad 
circumstances in which a change of a partnership’s 
membership—even one that involves a general partner—might 
cause no change in the substantive control of the partnership, in 
which case the notification requirement serves no purpose and is 
merely one more regulatory item on an adviser’s compliance 
checklist.  Third, the requirement, even if it serves a plausible 
regulatory function, is under-inclusive in its failure to encompass 
newer types of business associations, such as limited liability 
companies, and over-inclusive in its failure to acknowledge that, 
even in general partnerships, not every partner is an active 
participant in the business or significant owner whose departure 
should trigger the requirement.  Yet, year after year, lawyers, in 
drafting or reviewing the investment advisory agreements of 
their clients who are investment advisers organized as  
 
 
 
69 See id. § 80b-5. 
70 See id. § 80b-5(a)(3). 
71 See The Ayco Co., L.P., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL 861516, at *1–3 (Dec. 
14, 1995). 
FINAL_KRUG 2/27/2014  6:24 PM 
468 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:451   
partnerships, are careful to ensure the provision’s presence, as do 
the SEC examiners in their periodic reviews of those advisers’ 
businesses. 
Also under section 205, an investment advisory agreement 
must provide, in substance, that the adviser will not assign the 
agreement without the client’s consent,72 a requirement that 
seems similarly inefficient.  Specifically, as most any competent 
lawyer is aware, agreements often expressly contemplate the 
possibility that one party may, in the future, wish to assign its 
contractual rights and obligations and, accordingly, specify 
whether the counterparty’s consent is required for such an 
assignment.  Assignment provisions, in other words, are routine, 
almost rote, components of agreements.  They are, moreover, 
provisions of which parties to an investment advisory agreement 
presumably are aware, and those parties should have ample 
incentives, apart from those imposed by the Advisers Act, to 
include an assignment provision in their contractual 
arrangement.  More importantly, to the extent the adviser and 
the client have not meaningfully negotiated assignment terms, 
then regardless of the agreement’s specific language, the adviser 
presumably would be deemed to be in breach of its fiduciary 
duties to the client by assigning the agreement without having 
obtained the client’s consent or otherwise in a manner that may 
be deemed detrimental to the client.73 
Turning to the SEC’s rules under the Advisers Act, there is 
the advertising rule—rule 206(4)-1.74  That rule sets forth specific 
requirements for investment advisers’ “advertisements”—
 
72 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(2). 
73 Finally, section 205 specifies that no investment contract may provide for 
performance-based compensation—compensation based on the profit the adviser 
earns for the client—unless the compensation arrangements meet certain 
requirements, including whatever requirements the SEC may specify through its 
rulemaking. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(1), (e). Pursuant to that authorization, the 
SEC, in rule 205-3, requires that the adviser ensure that any client from whom it is 
to receive performance-based compensation meet the “qualified client” test, meaning 
that he or she must have a net worth of at least two million dollars or have placed at 
least one million dollars under the adviser’s management. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3 
(2013). The Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to revise these financial thresholds, 
based on inflation, every few years. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 418, 124 Stat. 1376, 1579 (2010) 
(providing that, by July 21, 2011 and every five years thereafter, the SEC must 
adjust for inflation the dollar amount thresholds in rules issued under Advisers Act 
§ 205(e)). 
74 See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)–1. 
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basically any communication regarding an adviser’s services or 
performance sent to more than one person—including, for 
example, that advertisements may not contain testimonials, that 
they may not state that an advisory service will be provided free 
of charge unless it actually is provided free of charge, and that 
they may not “represent[], directly or indirectly, that any graph, 
chart, formula or other device being offered can in and of itself be 
used to determine which securities to buy or sell, or when to buy 
or sell them.”75  The rule also specifies that no advertisement 
may contain any “past specific recommendations” that “were or 
would have been profitable to any person,” unless, essentially, 
the advertisement or a separately-provided list sets forth all of 
the “recommendations” made by the adviser in the past year.76 
It is difficult to know where to begin with this rule, as it 
raises a number of questions that the SEC staff have not 
definitively answered.77  The spirit behind the rule is clear:  
Advisers should not “cherry pick”—that is, they should not 
mention only profitable trades in their advertisements without 
also mentioning trades that were unprofitable.  However, one 
substantial challenge for advisers and their counsel has been to 
understand what is a “past” recommendation, as opposed to a 
current recommendation or a future recommendation.  If an 
adviser bought IBM stock three months ago, and that stock has 
appreciated in value, but the adviser has not yet sold it, is IBM a 
past or a present recommendation?  If the adviser bought Google 
stock on behalf of it clients and expects that the investment will 
be profitable, is that a past, a present, or a future 
recommendation?  Moreover, and turning to a second thorny 
component of the rule, was or would that recommendation have 
been profitable to any person?  What if the IBM investment 
described above was profitable in the first month but then  
 
 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 The first hurdle is to understand what “recommendation” as used in this rule 
might mean. One might be inclined to think “recommending” is what happens when 
an investment adviser suggests that a client make a particular investment or 
endorses a particular securities transaction. One would be correct in so thinking, 
but, in this context—and, perversely a few other, but not all, contexts under the 
Advisers Act—it also encompasses an adviser’s discretionary securities transactions 
on behalf of a client, even where the client has no inkling that the transaction is 
occurring. 
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decreased in value to a point below the original purchase price?  
Can we say the investment was or would have been profitable to 
any person? 
These questions are more than academic, as their answers 
determine whether an adviser is in violation of the SEC’s rules.  
Unfortunately, the SEC staff have been slow and incomplete in 
their elaboration of the meaning of the rule, and any elaboration 
that occurs outside of the SEC’s sporadic interpretive releases 
tends to be conservative and restrictive.  The fact remains, 
however, that a core component of an adviser’s interactions with 
its clients is its periodic descriptions of what, exactly, the adviser 
has done with its clients’ assets, what investment opportunities 
seem ripe for the taking, and what the adviser plans to do going 
forward.  The SEC’s too-specific, too-detailed advertising rule, 
arguably veering from the anti-cherry-picking policy behind it, 
has often prevented advisers from providing those sorts of 
disclosures.  A prospect worth considering is whether the simple 
anti-fraud catch-all provision that is also part of the advertising 
rule could further the rule’s policy objectives without hindering 
investment advisers’ performance of their services in their 
clients’ best interests. 
V. EXAMINATION AND ENFORCEMENT 
Regulations and statutory provisions are only two of the 
critical components of any regulatory system.  Enforcement of 
those regulations and provisions is another fundamental 
component.  As described below, when it comes to U.S. regulation 
of investment advisers, a number of factors serve to undermine 
effective enforcement.  Of course, that enforcement measures 
may be wanting does not necessarily have any implications for 
the nature and content of the regulation itself.  However, there 
are ways in which better formulated regulation might better 
serve the goals of punishment, deterrence, and detecting 
wrongdoing, thereby promoting market integrity and protecting 
investors. 
As is the case for U.S. securities regulation generally, the 
primary federal enforcement authority for U.S. investment 
adviser regulation is the SEC.78  The SEC performs this function 
 
78 State regulators may also play a role in enforcement. In particular, pursuant 
to section 203A(b)(2) of the Advisers Act, state regulatory authorities may bring 
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in a variety of ways.  Investors or others may submit a complaint 
to the SEC staff regarding a particular investment adviser, and, 
should the SEC investigate the subject of the complaint, that 
investigation may ultimately lead to an enforcement action.79  
Alternatively, the SEC may review or monitor securities 
transactions by market participants, including investment 
advisers, to detect wrongdoing.80  For example, it may observe 
suspiciously-timed trades that indicate that an investment 
adviser or one of its employees has traded on inside 
information.81  If further investigation produces support for that 
possibility, the SEC may pursue an enforcement action.82  
Finally, the SEC staff, in the course of their periodic examination 
of an investment adviser’s books and records, may find that the 
adviser or its personnel has materially violated requirements 
under the Advisers Act or the SEC’s regulations thereunder and 
launch an enforcement action on that basis.83  Of course, it is also 
possible for an investment adviser simply to admit to having 
violated applicable laws and regulations, as was the case with 
Bernie Madoff. 
Enforcement in the investment advisory context has multiple 
roles.  That is, the SEC may bring enforcement actions against 
an investment adviser for such transgressions as failing to 
maintain its books and records in the manner required by the 
recordkeeping rule,84 charging performance fees to clients that do 
not meet the SEC’s prescribed financial sophistication test,85 and 
neglecting to follow procedures the SEC has mandated in 
connection with paying cash compensation to marketers engaged 
to solicit new clients.86  The SEC may also look to punish an 
investment adviser for arguably more severe activities, such as 
inappropriately using “soft dollars,” which are payments by 
 
fraud actions against SEC-registered investment advisers. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
3a(b)(2). 
79 See id. § 80b-9. 
80 See id. § 80b-4. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. § 80b-9. 
83 See John H. Walsh, Regulatory Supervision by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission: Examinations in a Disclosure-Enforcement Agency, 51 ADMIN L. REV. 
1229, 1231–32, 1239–40 (1999). 
84 See 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2 (2013). 
85 See id. § 275.205-3(a), (d)(1); supra note 70 (describing this sophistication 
test). 
86 See id. § 275.206(4)-3(a)–(b). 
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securities brokerage firms in recognition of brokerage 
commissions earned from transactions effected by the adviser on 
behalf of its clients;87 failing to provide disclosure to clients 
regarding particular conflicts of interest; or engaging in “style 
drift”—that is, straying from the investment strategy set forth in 
the disclosure provided to clients.88  Finally, the SEC may pursue 
the most harmful conduct—namely, more blatantly fraudulent 
activity, in which, for example, an adviser systematically 
overcharges clients for services rendered or misappropriates 
client assets for its own uses.89 
Intuitively, the most important role of enforcement is finding 
and punishing fraudulent activity that directly harms clients 
through depleting their assets in a manner that has nothing to 
do with the adviser’s investment advisory function.90  Most 
famously, and apart from Charles Ponzi himself, that is Madoff.  
That is also Arthur Nadel,91 Samuel Israel III,92 Nicholas 
Cosmo,93 Darren Berg,94 and many, many others.  The conduct of 
investment advisers who defraud their clients and investors of 
funds placed in their trust produces harm that is substantially 
greater than the harm arising from an adviser’s sloppy 
bookkeeping or failure to implement a privacy policy.  Quite  
 
 
87 See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(e). 
88 These activities typically constitute breaches of the fiduciary duty an adviser 
owes to clients, as described by the Supreme Court in Securities & Exchange 
Commission v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–92, 196–97 
(1963). 
89 The Advisers Act contains anti-fraud provisions, see 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6, as do 
the SEC’s rules under the Advisers Act, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.206(3)-1–.206(4)-8. 
90 Generally, that type of fraudulent conduct is a greater possibility where the 
adviser or one of its affiliates has “custody” of client assets. See 
17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(a), (d)(2). 
91 See Patricia Hurtado & Bob Van Voris, Ex-Florida Money Manager Nadel 
Sentenced to 168 Months in Prison for Fraud, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2010), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-21/ex-florida-money-manager-nadel-
sentenced-to-168-months-in-prison-for-fraud.html. 
92 Reuters, Hedge Fund Founder Given 20 Years for Investor Fraud, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 15, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/15/business/15bayou.html?_r=2& 
ref=samuelisraeliii&. 
93 See Thom Weidlich, Nicholas Cosmo Receives 25 Years in Prison for $413 
Million Ponzi Scheme, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2011-10-14/cosmo-gets-25-year-sentence-for-scheme.html. 
94 See Rami Grunbaum, Darren Berg Gets 18-Year Sentence for Ponzi Scheme, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 9, 2012, 6:35 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/business 
technology/2017465361_meridian10.html. 
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obviously, such conduct can, and often does, dramatically and 
permanently adversely impact the clients’ livelihoods and, 
indeed, their lives. 
Yet that sort of fraudulent activity is precisely the conduct 
that, so it appears, the SEC is least equipped to detect and 
punish.  Part of the reason may be that fraud of the worst sorts is 
nothing if not intentional and, therefore, difficult—very 
difficult—to detect.95  Because of that, one might surmise that the 
SEC would expend extra effort in the service of fraud detection 
efforts.  Perversely, however, although the SEC is very diligent, 
and largely effective, in detecting whether an adviser has 
complied with the more technical rules under the Advisers Act, 
anecdotal observations suggest that, by and large, it has not 
devoted significant attention to detecting intentionally 
fraudulent activity.  This conclusion arises from the manner in 
which SEC staff have often used their opportunities to examine 
what, exactly, an investment adviser—that is, one that is SEC-
registered—is doing vis-à-vis its clients and the assets they have 
placed under the adviser’s management. 
An SEC-registered investment adviser is subject to the SEC 
staff’s periodic—every three or four years or so—examination of 
the adviser’s books and records.96  These examinations 
encompass not only the staff’s reviewing the adviser’s records but 
also their interviewing firm personnel.97  The problem is that the 
focus of these examinations, which, in some cases, have been 
conducted by relatively inexperienced personnel, often center on 
the more technical, compliance-related aspects of the Advisers 
Act and its rules.  The product of an examination, moreover, is 
usually a deficiency letter that one might characterize as a “fix-it 
ticket,” requiring the adviser to correct its regulatory deficiencies 
and declare to the SEC that it has done so.98  Until recently, at 
least, the staff have made insufficient effort to verify client assets 
and securities held on their behalf.  Once again, Madoff is exhibit 
one in this regard. 
 
95 See Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Combating Securities 
Fraud at Home and Abroad (May 28, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/ 
spch052809laa.htm. 
96 See Walsh, supra note 83, at 1231. 
97 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, EXAMINATIONS BY THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION’S OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS 24 (2012), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ocie/ocieoverview.pdf. 
98 See Walsh, supra note 83, at 1238, 1240. 
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Whatever the Advisers Act’s provisions might say and 
whatever rules the SEC may adopt, investment adviser 
regulation will not achieve its goals without effective 
enforcement capabilities and, in particular, the ability to detect 
advisers’ intentionally fraudulent conduct.  Nonetheless, it is 
worth considering whether the nature of the current regulations 
and, in particular, their favoring technical requirements over 
broad disclosure standards, might be a distraction in the SEC’s 
enforcement efforts.  If SEC staff, in their examinations, are 
primarily concerned with whether an adviser dotted its “i’s” and 
crossed its “t’s” and otherwise complied with the detailed rules to 
which it is subject—and, arguably, so long as the rules exist, that 
is, indeed, a legitimate concern—then perhaps we should be 
neither surprised nor chagrined that detecting truly harmful 
behavior has apparently been given short shrift. 
CONCLUSION: CONSIDERATIONS FOR A BETTER APPROACH 
If the U.S. investment adviser regulatory regime is flawed, 
as this Article suggests, then it is a further question of what 
might be a better approach.  One implication of the concerns this 
Article has identified is that the U.S. laws and regulations 
governing investment advisers—and the public and private funds 
they manage—should be reconceptualized and reformulated from 
the ground up.  After all, those concerns encompass far-ranging 
problems, including ones associated with the Advisers Act’s 
structure and regulatory scope, regulatory and judicial doctrine 
based on the statute, and oversight and enforcement under it.  
Commensurately comprehensive reform, then, is likely in order, 
and one approach to pursuing it might be to look to other, non-
U.S. jurisdictions whose investment adviser regulatory regimes 
are relatively more modern than their U.S. counterpart. 
Success in such reform efforts may not seem particularly 
unreasonable, considering both the vintage of the U.S. securities 
laws and regulations and the evolution of the investment adviser 
industry since their inception.  However—and as might be 
obvious—prospects for reform must be considered in the context 
of political realities, which counsel that even incremental 
regulatory changes are likely targets of fierce resistance, 
depending on whose interests those changes are deemed to 
adversely affect.  As noted in the Introduction, the Dodd-Frank 
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Act included a number of amendments to the Advisers Act.99  At 
least some participants in the reform process that culminated in 
Dodd-Frank presumably acknowledged the possible need for 
thoroughgoing changes to the statute.  Yet, as noted, the reforms 
that ultimately came to be were far from comprehensive.100 
It is worth mentioning one component of some recent reform 
proposals—namely, the creation of a self-regulatory organization 
(“SRO”) for investment advisers, along the lines of the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority, which regulates broker-dealers, 
and the National Futures Association and “designated” SROs, 
such as the Commodity Mercantile Exchange, which govern 
regulated participants in the commodity futures industry.101  It 
may be that an SRO would be a useful complement to investment 
adviser regulation.  Among other things, such a regulator, 
privately funded and with its own personnel and oversight 
resources, could improve overall regulatory monitoring and 
enforcement.  Nonetheless, to be effective in that regard, the SRO 
arguably would need to have developed and implemented 
investigation and fraud-detection procedures that surpass those 
that the SEC has heretofore demonstrated.102  It is by no means a 
certainty that the organization could or would do so.  The 
National Futures Association’s and the CME Group’s recent, and 
dismal, regulatory failures provide ample reason for 
skepticism.103 
More to the point, in light of the arguments presented in this 
Article, it is difficult to conceive of an SRO improving the 
regulatory situation without policymakers first—or 
simultaneously—achieving the comprehensive legal and 
regulatory changes contemplated above.  Indeed, without that 
reform, the presence of an SRO presumably could make matters 
 
99 See supra notes 2–7 and accompanying text. 
100 See supra notes 2–7 and accompanying text. 
101 More recently, in April 2012, Representative Spencer Bachus (R-AL) 
introduced a bill in the House of Representatives that would establish an SRO for 
investment advisers. See Investment Adviser Oversight Act of 2012, H.R. 4624, 
112th Cong. § 203B(a) (2012). 
102 See supra Part V. 
103 See Azam Ahmed & Ben Protess, Clients Question CME Oversight of MF 
Global, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 9, 2011, 10:32 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes. 
com/2011/11/09/clients-question-oversight-by-mf-globals-regulator/; Silla Brush & 
Matthew Leising, Peregrine Has U.S. Futures Regulators on Defense in Congress, 
BLOOMBERG (July 25, 2012, 1:42 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-
25/peregrine-has-u-s-futures-regulators-on-defense-at-house-panel.html. 
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worse, by imposing an additional regulatory layer onto one that 
is already too complex and too incoherent.  Put another way, 
creating a new regulatory authority could be yet another 
piecemeal regulatory fix that could further obscure, if not 
exacerbate, more extensive and entrenched regulatory 
shortcomings.  Better investment adviser regulation—that is, 
more effective and efficient investor protection and promotion of 
market integrity—requires, in some sense, returning to square 
one and thinking critically about what that regulation should be 
and what it should accomplish. 
 
